Payment for ecosystem services markets on Aboriginal land in Cape York Pensinsula: potential and constraints by Winer, Michael et al.
Social Dimensions of Green Economy and Sustainable Development
Michael Winer, Helen Murphy 
and Harold Ludwick
United Nations
Research Institute
for Social Development
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Payment for Ecosystem Services 
Markets on Aboriginal Land in Cape 
York Peninsula 
Potential and Constraints 
 
Michael Winer, Helen Murphy and Harold Ludwick 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United Nations 
Research Institute  
for Social Development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Occasional Paper Six 
Social Dimensions of Green Economy  
and Sustainable Development 
April 2012 
 
 
This United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) Occasional Paper has been produced in 
collaboration with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES). UNRISD thanks the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 
supporting the conference, Green Economy and Sustainable Development: Bringing Back the Social Dimension, and 
the governments of Denmark, Finland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and the United Kingdom for their core funding. 
 
Illustrations on front cover: Aine Cassidy. 
 
Copyright © UNRISD. Short extracts from this publication may be reproduced unaltered without authorization on 
condition that the source is indicated. For rights of reproduction or translation, application should be made to UNRISD, 
Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. UNRISD welcomes such applications. 
 
The designations employed in UNRISD publications, which are in conformity with United Nations practice, and the 
presentation of material therein do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of UNRISD con-
cerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its 
frontiers or boundaries. 
 
The responsibility for opinions expressed rests solely with the author(s), and publication does not constitute endorse-
ment by UNRISD. 
ISBN  978-9-29-085086-1
 Contents 
Acronyms ii 
Summary iii 
Introduction 1 
Payment for Ecosystem Services 2 
Natural Resource Management in Cape York 3 
Environmental Legislation 6 
Wild Rivers Act 6 
Land clearance laws 7 
Impacts on Indigenous Landholders 10 
Weak property rights 11 
Regulatory challenges 14 
Conclusion 15 
Bibliography 18 
 
Figures 
Figure 1: Map of Cape York towns and communities 4 
Figure 2: Map of declared Archer, Lockhart and Stewart Basins wild river areas 7 
Figure 3: Change in carbon dioxide emissions in Australia 1990–2009 9 
Figure 4:  Remnant woody vegetation in Queensland 10 
Figure 5: Cape York land tenure map 12 
 
 
 Acronyms 
 
AU$ Australian dollar 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CFI Carbon Farming Initiative 
CYPAL Cape York Peninsula Aboriginal Land 
DERM Department of Environment and Resource Management 
DOGIT Deed of Grant in Trust 
ILUA Indigenous Land Use Agreement 
LULUCF Land use, land use change and forestry 
NETT National Emissions Trading Taskforce 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NRM Natural resource management 
NTA Native Title Act 
PES Payment for Ecosystem Services 
Qld Queensland 
REDD Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
 
ii 
 Summary 
In the global arena, improving environmental outcomes at the same time as ensuring social 
equity outcomes for disadvantaged landholder groups has become increasingly important. This 
is especially true in regions with pressing environmental problems populated by low-income 
indigenous land stewards. The ability of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes to lift 
poor people out of poverty and, in particular, the potential for PES schemes to improve social 
and welfare conditions in remote Australian indigenous communities is increasingly being 
recognized. Based on research in Cape York, Australia, this paper argues that a new approach 
to environmental management is needed to incorporate PES market participation by indigenous 
landowners. This is because the current framework for environmental management on Cape 
York is failing on two fronts: it is delivering suboptimal environmental outcomes and 
constraining the economic development aspirations of traditional owners. Current barriers to 
participation by indigenous communities in the Cape York Peninsula in PES markets—
including legislative constraints and the existence of weak Aboriginal land and property 
rights—must be overcome.  
 
This paper argues that insufficient government funding and lack of indigenous involvement in 
design and implementation of natural resource management (NRM) has resulted in increased 
environmental risk in the region and an NRM system characterized by insufficient, unreliable 
and short-term government funding. Such funding regimes result in communities becoming 
financially dependent, politically vulnerable and disempowered from decision making, 
discouraging entrepreneurism and career development opportunities. There has been an overall 
lack of formal recognition and at times active undermining of Aboriginal governance structures 
by the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to achieve political outcomes, 
further weakening Aboriginal negotiation and governance capability and disempowering 
indigenous NRM on their lands. 
 
PES market participation could enable indigenous people in Cape York to reap the rewards 
gained from market participation by taking responsibility for environmental stewardship on 
their lands. One of the barriers that currently constrain indigenous development in PES markets 
is the multiple layering of environmental legislation. The restrictions on indigenous land use 
imposed by the current complex regime of environmental legislation greatly devalues the 
potential for indigenous people to engage with the voluntary and potential mandatory market 
for carbon and ecosystem services without any significant improvements in NRM outcomes 
stemming from this regulatory overload. The system of legislation and regulation imposes a 
very heavy burden of environmental maintenance on communities with little capacity to bear 
the cost.  
 
Another important contributing factor is the underlying existence of weak Aboriginal land and 
property rights. Where there is lack of security and certainty of indigenous landholding 
(through native title rights, as well as other rights and interests) it is difficult to achieve the 
levels of permanence required to demonstrate ecosystem service benefits. Restrictions imposed 
on indigenous land use by NRM laws and regulations have the effect of transferring property 
rights and environmental values to society with little or no consideration of or accountability 
for the actual NRM costs that are required.  The opportunity costs of imposing poorly designed 
blanket restrictions over entire landscapes disproportionately impact on indigenous 
communities that have not developed their land or had the chance to consider future land use 
options.  
 
A new approach to environmental regulation that genuinely recognizes the conditions and 
history of Cape York is needed. An approach such as PES would seek to reconcile the legitimate 
development aspirations of traditional owners with effective environmental protection 
mechanisms, instead of creating conflict. What should have become one of the biggest economic 
values and opportunities for the Aboriginal people of the region—ecosystem services—is now 
increasingly becoming a liability. While, in some cases, a higher perceived level of potential or 
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real threat to the environment can provide the impetus for implementation of ecosystem service 
schemes, in Cape York, many major perceived threats have now been legally removed from the 
region and are no longer tradable. For example, land clearance laws have halted land clearing 
so one cannot trade that right for carbon credits through avoided deforestation. While there are 
still some significant PES opportunities such as fire management for carbon credits and some 
broader ecosystem services such as feral animal and weed control, many major opportunities 
that are developing nationally, such as tree planting and land use changes related to 
agriculture, are not relevant to an undamaged landscape. The remaining PES opportunities 
come nowhere near compensating for the acquired carbon and environmental values.   
 
If Cape York is to realize the larger opportunities—the opportunities that could potentially fund 
the real costs and effective management of this vast and ecologically rich region—then 
significant policy changes will need to be made by governments at the state and federal level. 
These include: 
 
• strengthening indigenous land tenure and property rights;  
• enacting long-term, integrated NRM goals and programmes with greater indigenous 
participation;  
• legally requiring Indigenous Land Use Agreements (ILUAs)1 as part of any consent process for 
land use change on Aboriginal land such as new conservation regimes or industrial 
development; 
• the further exploration of PES approaches as complements to existing conservation tools; and 
• the establishment of a supportive legislative and policy environment to enable indigenous 
participation in PES markets. 
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currently manages the Aurukun Opportunity Hub as part of innovative welfare reform trials in 
Cape York. 
 
 
1  “The Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA) is a voluntary agreement between a native title group and others about the use and 
management of land and waters.” Source: Agreements, Treaties and Negotiated Settlements database,  
www.atns.net.au/subcategory.asp?subcategoryid=121, accessed on 3  February  2012. 
 Introduction 
In the global arena, there has been an increased understanding and focus on the challenges of 
improving environmental outcomes at the same time as ensuring social equity outcomes for 
disadvantaged land-holding groups. This is especially true in regions with high environmental 
values and pressing environmental problems populated by indigenous land stewards with very 
low levels of income and limited economic opportunities, such as the Peruvian Amazon, Coron 
Island in the Philippines and the Borana ethnic territory in Ethiopia. In Australia, the potential 
for Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes to improve social and welfare conditions in 
remote Australian indigenous communities is increasingly being recognized (Zander and 
Garnett 2011; Garnett et al. 2009). This paper argues that a new approach to environmental 
management in Cape York is needed, built around strengthened indigenous land tenure and 
property rights; longer-term natural resource management (NRM) goals and programmes with 
greater indigenous participation; and the incorporation of PES markets characterized by broad 
private investment and enabled by a supportive legislative and policy environment. This is 
because the current framework for environmental management on Cape York is failing on two 
fronts: it is delivering suboptimal environmental outcomes and is constraining the economic 
development aspirations of traditional owners. However, current barriers to participation by 
indigenous communities in the Cape York Peninsula in PES markets—including environmental 
legislative constraints and the existence of weak Aboriginal land and property rights—must 
first be overcome.  
 
The remoteness and limited economic options in Cape York means that payments for land 
management are crucial for improving social outcomes for indigenous communities. Income 
derived from land management enables indigenous people to fulfil cultural responsibilities by 
caring for country and maintaining the health of country through “the physical presence of its 
traditional owners” (Zander and Garnett 2011:1). However, insufficient government funding 
and lack of indigenous involvement in design and implementation of natural resource 
management (NRM) has resulted in increased environmental risk in the region. It has also led 
to an NRM system characterized by insufficient, unreliable and short-term government 
funding. Such funding regimes result in communities becoming financially dependent, 
politically vulnerable and disempowered from decision making, discouraging entrepreneurism 
and career development opportunities. Disturbingly, there has been an overall lack of formal 
recognition, and at times active undermining, of Aboriginal governance structures by the 
government and non-governmental organization (NGOs) to achieve political outcomes, further 
weakening Aboriginal negotiation and governance capability, and disempowering indigenous 
NRM on their lands. 
 
PES market participation could enable indigenous people in Cape York to reap the rewards 
gained from market participation by taking responsibility for environmental stewardship on 
their lands. One of the barriers that currently constrains indigenous development in PES 
markets is the multiple layering of environmental legislation. The restrictions on indigenous 
land use imposed by the current complex regime of environmental legislation greatly devalues 
the potential for indigenous people to engage with the voluntary and potential mandatory 
market for carbon and ecosystem services without any significant improvements in NRM 
outcomes stemming from this regulatory overload. The system of legislation and regulation 
imposes a very heavy burden of environmental maintenance on communities with little 
capacity to bear the cost.  
 
Another important contributing factor is the existence of weak Aboriginal land and property 
rights. Where there is a lack of security and certainty of indigenous landholding (through native 
title rights, as well as other rights and interests), it is difficult to achieve the levels of 
permanence required to demonstrate ecosystem service benefits. Restrictions imposed on 
indigenous land use by NRM laws and regulations have the effect of transferring property 
rights and environmental values to society with little or no consideration of, or accountability 
for, the actual NRM costs that are required. The opportunity costs of imposing poorly designed 
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blanket restrictions over entire landscapes disproportionately impact on indigenous 
communities that have not developed their land or had the chance to consider future land use 
options.  
 
Based on research in Cape York, Australia, this paper examines the obstacles that prevent 
indigenous participation in PES markets. This paper is structured as follows: first, we outline 
the conceptual framework of the paper and the background of Cape York. This is followed by a 
brief overview of current green economy approaches in Queensland, followed by a discussion 
of the main issues facing indigenous communities in Cape York regarding their involvement in 
PES, including the effect of restrictive regulation and legislation, and weak land tenure and 
property rights.  
Payment for Ecosystem Services 
Recent years have seen PES schemes being increasingly used as an alternative approach to fund 
environmental management both globally and in Australia. The driving idea behind PES is that 
the provision of environmental services that provide a public benefit should be recognized 
financially. The PES model is an attempt to assign a financial value to critically important 
services such as the provision of clean water or maintenance of biodiversity, and thus develop a 
market-based solution as part of the NRM toolbox. This paper uses Wunder’s definition of PES 
as “a voluntary transaction where a well-defined ecosystem service (or a land use likely to secure 
that service) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) PES buyer from a (minimum one) ecosystem 
service provider if and only if the ecosystem service provider secures ecosystem service 
provision (conditionality)” (Wunder 2005:3). Another key dimension of PES is the requirement 
for additionality. This means that services must show that payment causes the benefit to occur 
where it would not have done otherwise. That is, “what would have happened if there had been 
no intervention (a counterfactual event that is not observed)?” (Ferrarro and Patanayak 2006). 
To put it another way, there must be a causal relationship between the payment and the 
ecosystem service delivered. 
 
The PES paradigm seeks to move away from traditional approaches to conservation and 
development based on either “fortress-type” approaches of protected area management or 
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects focused on trade-offs between conservation 
groups and local communities (Dahlberg and Burlando 2009). Thus it represents “a departure in 
traditional approaches to environmental protection, land use controls and service provision 
strategies” (Salzman 2009:16). The question of whether this approach has the potential to benefit 
low-income land stewards (see Milder et al. 2010) is one that must be examined carefully. 
Results from several studies indicate that “PES does or could provide important livelihood 
benefits to poor people at the household or community level, whether in the form of cash 
payments or noncash benefits such as…establishing more secure land tenure, or strengthening 
social capital and supportive local institutions” (Milder et al. 2010:3). However, while the 
potential of PES schemes to “result in increased social welfare” has been noted (Salzman 
2009:16), overall there is a lack of research into the costs and benefits of emerging PES markets 
(Landell-Mills and Porras 2002; EcoTrust 2009). In particular, we lack answers to the questions 
of whether payments deliver additional environmental services compared to other policy 
approaches, and in what situations PES schemes most effectively improve environmental and 
social conditions (Ferraro 2011:1135). 
 
PES is a tool tailored to address a specific set of problems: those in which ecosystems are 
mismanaged because many of their benefits are externalities from the perspective of ecosystem 
managers (Engel et al. 2008). And as with other tools for ecosystem management, it suffers from 
“real world constraints” such as adverse selection, poor administrative targeting, poor contract 
allocation and price-setting (Ferraro 2011:1135). Hence, good system design is crucial, as badly 
designed PES schemes can either fail altogether, or fail to produce social development 
objectives for disadvantaged participants. High transaction costs, including unclear property 
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rights, inadequate or complex regulatory frameworks, inadequate skills and education, 
inadequate finance, insufficient communication infrastructure, high coordination costs and 
weak political voice can impede market development (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). 
International experience with PES approaches in Asia, North and South America, and Africa 
show the need for accurate valuation of ecosystems, supportive policy, legal and institutional 
frameworks and the importance of careful system design to prevent elite capture. In addition, 
the importance of secure property rights and good governance has been widely noted.2 
 
That said, while we recognize that PES schemes have disadvantages and constraints, we also 
believe that, on balance, they can also offer important benefits if correctly designed and 
implemented. Well-designed PES schemes as part of a larger natural resource management 
framework have the potential to complement existing conventional conservation mechanisms 
by increasing funding and potentially giving more flexibility to land managers. In particular, 
we note Ferraro’s recommendation that PES “as a tool for investing conservation funds [as 
opposed to raising funds for conservation] …promise to be strong complements to regulatory 
and norm-based approaches and substitutes to indirect alternative-livelihoods approaches” 
(Ferraro 2011:1137). We also note that more research into the environmental and social 
outcomes of PES schemes is urgently needed. 
Natural Resource Management in Cape York 
Cape York is a sparsely populated region of north Queensland that holds within its 137,000 
square kilometres ecosystems of global ecological significance. Its diverse ecosystems such as 
wetlands, monsoonal rivers, extensive undamaged tropical rainforest, heath lands, dune fields 
and tropical savannah woodlands have a high level of retained integrity. Over 3,000 plant 
species and 500 species of terrestrial vertebrates have been recorded in Cape York. This includes 
a quarter of Australia’s frogs and reptiles, half of Australia’s birds, a third of the mammals and 
nearly two-thirds of the country’s butterflies (Earth Tech 2005:37). In addition, the region is also 
home to globally significant populations of crocodiles, dugong, turtles and cassowary. Thus it is 
said to “encompass a living mosaic of interlocking habitats that provide a globally outstanding 
resource for the in-situ conservation of biodiversity” (Mackey et al. 2001:11). 
 
About two-thirds of the 15,000 people that live in Cape York self-identify as indigenous (ABS 
2008, cited in Winer et al. 2009). The indigenous population represents over 50 language groups 
and presents a great diversity of culture. This indigenous population is mainly situated in 
seventeen separate communities on or near the coast, including Wujal, Mossman Gorge, 
Kaurareg (Horn Island), Hope Vale, Lockhart River, New Mapoon, Aurukun, Injinoo, Umagico, 
Old Mapoon, Pormpuraaw, Napranum and Kowanyama (see figure 1) (Winer et al. 2009).  
 
After a history of bitter conflict with white settlers and forced removals of Aboriginal 
populations, the majority of Cape York is now covered by various levels of native title 
recognition. Approximately 40 per cent of the land in Cape York is Aboriginal-owned or 
controlled (or soon will be through the Queensland Land State Dealing process). The Aboriginal 
freehold or Deed of Grant in Trust (DOGIT) lands (comprising approximately 3,235,620 
hectares) coexist with a similar area of national parks and nature refuges as well as substantial 
Aboriginal-owned pastoral leases (Balkanu and Cape York Institute 2007:1). The remainder of 
Cape York consists primarily of pastoral leases and mining leases. Through the Cape York 
Heritage Act, national parks will now have underlying Aboriginal ownership and joint 
management and are included as part of the Aboriginal estate.  
                                                          
2  Rojas and Aylward 2003; Russo and Candela 2006; Ecotrust, 2009; Rakshi 2009. 
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Figure 1: Map of Cape York towns and communities  
 
 
Source: Cape York Sustainable Futures 2010:25.  
 
Despite being the owners and managers of large tracts of land and sea containing a diverse 
array of cultural, ecological, economic and social values and assets, many Aboriginal 
communities in the Cape are characterized by widespread disadvantage and welfare 
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dependence. It has been acknowledged that “indigenous Australians are suffering because of an 
overly bureaucratic system imposed on them that has left many ‘land rich but dirt poor’” 
(Peatling 2005:1). This manifests itself in a system characterized by indigenous dependence on 
government funding for NRM initiatives. Reliance on short-term funding results in indigenous 
NRM organizations chasing immediate funding opportunities at the expense of long-term goals 
and programmes. The result is not only ad hoc decisions, duplication of services and lack of 
strategic planning, but also little development of long-term infrastructure, skills and activities 
(Balkanu and Cape York Institute 2007). In recent years, there has been significant local pressure 
on indigenous people to forgo significant property rights to retain funding under new 
conservation regimes. Thus we recommend enacting long-term, integrated NRM goals and 
programmes with greater indigenous participation as well as legally requiring Indigenous Land 
Use Agreements (ILUAs) as part of any process of land use change on Aboriginal land, such as 
additional formal conservation regimes. 
 
It has also been recognized that government spending on natural resource management in Cape 
York is insufficient given the vast size of the region and the increased costs associated with 
managing land in remote areas.3 The Queensland government has long been criticized for 
insufficient financial resourcing and level of staff for national parks.4 As such, and despite the 
introduction of stricter environmental legislation and regimes, critical environmental issues 
such as weeds, feral animals, fire management and quarantine continue to affect the region. 
Adopting an approach based mainly on legislation that cannot be effectively implemented on 
the ground means the vast task of environmental management across remote Australia will 
remain an unfundable challenge for the government. Instead, PES market participation by 
indigenous landowners in Cape York should be enabled, in order to provide long-term funding 
through perpetual agreements and contracts that can directly benefit land managers. It is 
unknown at the present time what level of funding PES schemes may be expected to provide, 
however, as stated earlier, the potential for Cape York ecosystem services is significant. The 
authors believe that more research needs to be done into the real management costs of 
environmental protection, the size of the market needed to ensure this level of funding, as well 
as the social and economic cost of lost development opportunities. In short, much work needs to 
be done to ensure that future environmental and development needs are met.  
 
There are some positive initiatives currently being implemented by the federal government. 
These include the Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) and related Biodiversity Fund, and the 
Working on Country programme. The CFI will recognize some PES opportunities, such as the 
Carbon Fire initiative, which will reintroduce traditional burning patterns that significantly 
reduce emissions from current wildfire methods. The Biodiversity Fund combined with carbon 
abatement may help fund feral pig and cattle control pending the outcome of supporting 
research. Working on Country currently employs 70 Aboriginal rangers across Cape York and 
allows a much greater level of Aboriginal control of land management priorities and methods 
and is proving a more  positive programme than other  ineffective regimes. 
 
As ecosystem managers on their lands, Aboriginal people currently receive few benefits from 
land uses such as forest conservation. They are paid minimal amounts to manage their land by 
the government and environmental outcomes suffer. Self-funded management through a 
combination of government transfers, enabling PES opportunities and broader economic equity 
may be a viable option to improve environmental outcomes. It must be noted that while PES 
opportunities and environmental regulation should work together to complement each other; 
currently this is not the case in Cape York. With these two approaches in opposition, the result 
is poorly enforced complex environmental legislation that benefits neither the environment nor 
traditional owners. With greater opportunities to pursue PES schemes, environmental 
                                                          
3  Environmental and natural resource management activity represents up to 10 per cent of total economic activity in Cape York, with 
financial inputs mostly provided through government transfers for services, grants and community development employment projects 
(Balkanu and Cape York Institute 2007). 
4 Gall 1994; Beeton 2001; Larsen 2005. 
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protection may be enhanced, but care must also be taken to ensure schemes entered into are 
carefully designed and carried out. However, while PES schemes could provide both a way to 
reduce reliance on government funding and increase indigenous participation in NRM, 
meaningful indigenous participation in PES markets is currently impeded by (but not limited 
to) the following factors: (i) environmental legislation and (ii) weak underlying land and 
property rights. These factors will be examined in the following section. 
Environmental Legislation 
Over the last several decades, Cape York’s indigenous communities have been burdened by 
increasing amounts of environmental legislation and conservation regimes. Major pieces of 
legislation and zonings include the Vegetation Management Act (1999) (land clearance laws), 
the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999), the Biodiversity Act 
(2004) (Qld), the Wild Rivers Act (2005) (Qld) and the Nature Conservation Act (1992) and a 
mosaic of protected areas such as expansion of the national park estate, indigenous protected 
areas, nature refuges and proposals for World Heritage listing. However, the cumulative impact 
of these environmental laws and regimes severely limits economic choice and options on 
Aboriginal lands and has the same effect as the use of resumption powers of property by 
government but without a fair and reasonable process to protect the legal and economic rights 
of individuals and families—in other words, the appropriation and gifting away of property 
rights. In addition, the intact nature of Cape York and its high levels of biodiversity result in a 
much larger proportional impact of conservation legislation over these remote Aboriginal 
homelands. As it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in detail all environmental 
legislation affecting land management in Cape York, here we explore just two examples that 
highlight some of the ways in which legislation acts to impede indigenous participation in PES 
markets.5 
Wild Rivers Act 
The Wild Rivers Act 2005 has significant implications for indigenous participation in PES 
markets. The Queensland government has increased environmental protection over many of the 
rivers of Cape York, announcing on 3 April 2009 that it had made declarations over 13 wild 
rivers and their catchment areas in the Cape York Peninsula under the Wild Rivers Act 2005 
(Qld) (McLoughlin 2009:3). The act covers over 20 rivers flowing through the Gulf of 
Carpentaria, Cape York, Hinchinbrook and Fraser Islands, many of which are recognized as 
Aboriginal lands or waters. It seeks to preserve these rivers that have been deemed to have “all, 
or almost all, of their natural values intact” (Wild Rivers Act 2005). The act provides for four 
types of management zones: high preservation, preservation, sub-artesian and floodplain 
management areas as well as designated urban areas and nominated waterways management 
areas. High preservation areas are covered by the most restrictive conditions, with land up to 
one kilometre on either side of the river “prohibited” for use for animal husbandry, agriculture, 
aquaculture and surface mining. Broader preservation areas covering all land in entire wild 
river catchment areas  provide environmental and government agencies with a powerful  
weapon  to limit new development activities by the very definition and intent of the word 
preservation (that is, the maintenance of something in an unchanged condition). 
 
Five wild river basin declarations on Cape York have already been made, incorporating many 
distinct river systems—the Stewart Basin, Lockhart Basin, Archer Basin (see figure 2 below) and 
the Wenlock and Staaten Basins. As entire basin areas can be declared wild river areas, each 
declaration can cover multiple rivers. For example, the declarations of the Stewart, Lockhart 
and Archer Basins cover 13 rivers and as such cover a larger portion of land than appears at first 
glance. The areas considered high preservation areas under the five declarations are those most 
                                                          
5  More detail of relevant legislation and its impact on indigenous participation in PES markets can be accessed on the Cape York 
Institute website, www.cyi.org.au. 
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likely to support indigenous economic development, including PES-based activities. 
Government and green groups are proposing a further eight basin declarations that, when 
added to those already declared, will cover over 75 per cent of the Aboriginal homelands on 
Cape York. 
 
Figure 1: Map of declared Archer, Lockhart and Stewart Basins wild river areas 
 
Note: High preservation areas are marked in dark yellow with broader basin preservation zones in pink which also covers national parks 
within the declared basins.  Source: Queensland government, DERM website, www.derm.qld.gov.au, accessed on 3 February 2012. 
 
The restrictions on indigenous land use imposed by the wild rivers scheme have significantly 
reduced the opportunity for PES–based activities. This is most evident in the case of high 
preservation areas. The requirement to achieve additionality generates difficulties where 
environmental regulation already operates to protect natural values. The protective effect of 
environmental regulation reduces the potential for additionality by crowding out any 
additional environmental benefits that can be achieved through the provision of PES. This is 
particularly damaging to indigenous participation in PES, as high preservation areas are likely 
to contain high-value ecosystem service assets such as waterways, forested areas and high 
biodiversity values (Taft 2011). In addition, if this legislation is poorly enforced, indigenous 
landowners not only suffer continued environmental problems, but are also unable to 
participate in PES schemes that have the potential to result in equal if not greater environmental 
benefits.    
Land clearance laws 
A second form of legislation that acts to impede indigenous participation in PES markets is land 
clearance laws (such as the Vegetation Management Act). Due to a historical legacy of relatively 
low rates of land clearing, much of the remaining remnant vegetation in Queensland is situated 
on Cape York Peninsula. Areas in southern and south-eastern Queensland bear less of the 
burden of this legislation, because there is less remnant vegetation remaining as a consequence 
of extensive land clearing for economic development. For instance, land clearance laws and 
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bans are applied in over 99 per cent of Cape York, whereas in more populated areas in South-
East Queensland less that 20 per cent of forest cover remains. These land clearance laws have 
two key impacts: the first is a huge opportunity cost by removing options for future 
development that require land clearance, such as agriculture. The second impact is that they 
capture the potential carbon and ecosystem service values of the land. 
 
Land clearing controls have been shown to directly contribute to Australia’s ability to meet its 
Kyoto Protocol target, yet there is little recognition of the way in which they limit opportunities 
for Cape York Peninsula indigenous communities to participate in the “green economy” 
through future emissions abatement activities (NETT 2007:159). Cape York Peninsula will be 
penalized in several ways in respect to carbon pricing. The relative absence of past land clearing 
on Aboriginal freehold land in the Cape York Peninsula means that the capacity to market 
environmental services such as reforestation (“carbon sinks”) is limited. Under the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cape York is characterized as retaining 
high forest cover through low rates of deforestation, which means there is little opportunity to 
participate in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) projects 
(da Fonseca et al. 2007). If Cape York Peninsula indigenous communities had engaged in major 
broad-acre land clearing, there would have been opportunities to develop and market Kyoto 
compliant carbon sinks. In addition, Kyoto rules mean that Australian businesses will be able to 
acquire emissions offsets from non-Annex I countries (developing countries such as Indonesia 
and Papua New Guinea) under an emissions trading regime, but will not have similar 
incentives to support emissions abatement in Cape York Peninsula. Thus Cape York Peninsula 
indigenous communities have been bequeathed responsibility for the management of the native 
forest environment through restrictive conservation legislation and regimes but with no 
consideration of local capacity to bear these costs.  
 
Australia will meet its Kyoto Protocol target almost solely because of controls on land use, land 
use change and forestry (LULUCF) primarily in New South Wales and Queensland. In the 
absence of these changes, Australia would probably have exceeded its Kyoto Protocol 
commitment target by more than 9 per cent (Farrow 2011:8). In carbon accounting, this is due to 
reductions in deforestation and increases in afforestation and reforestation. If these LULUCF 
changes had not taken place, Australia would probably have had emissions of about 118 per 
cent of its Kyoto Protocol target  (Farrow 2011:13). Kyoto Protocol rules exclude forests 
established prior to 1990 and require “additionality” in order to be recognized. This effectively 
excludes any recognition of the emissions abatement role played by existing native forests on 
indigenous land in the Cape York Peninsula despite the financial value derived by government 
and industry from the future avoided liability of emissions from land clearing. It could be said 
that the Australian government has extracted payment for an ecosystem service through the 
avoided carbon liability associated with future land clearing retired under land clearance laws. 
This should not be their payment to receive. A fair and reasonable approach would have been 
to enter into a voluntary PES/resource rental agreement through an ILUA with expectations of 
carbon stewardship built into the agreement. 
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Figure 3: Change in carbon dioxide emissions in Australia, 1990–2009 
 
Source: Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian Greenhouse Emissions Information System database, 
http://ageis.climatechange.gov.au/ accessed on 30 May 2011. 
 
The 2007 National Emissions Trading Taskforce (NETT) report noted significant emissions 
abatement from the LULUCF sector: 
 
Avoided deforestation has already made a significant contribution to 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Australia. For example, the phase-out 
of broad-scale land clearing in Queensland and New South Wales has done 
more than any other action to help Australia achieve its 2008–12 target under 
the Kyoto Protocol. Internationally, a number of groups are examining 
whether a robust methodology can be developed that would appropriately 
reward avoided land clearing (NETT 2007:159). 
 
Emissions (or liabilities) avoided through the controls on land use change in just 10 per cent of 
Aboriginal land in Cape York Peninsula would be approximately 32 million tonnes, and if 
valued at AU$ 236 per tonne would raise AU$ 736 million (Cape York Institute estimate 2010). 
A 2003 map of Queensland showing the distribution of remnant woody vegetation illustrates 
the extent to which Cape York Peninsula represents a substantial proportion of Queensland’s 
uncleared land.  
 
                                                          
6 AU$1 = US$1.03 approximately (April 2012). 
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Figure 4:  Remnant woody vegetation in Queensland  
 
Source: DAFF 2003: Figure 4.5, p. 12. 
 
In 2009, the then Queensland Minister for Natural Resources, Mines and Energy, Hon. Stephen 
Robertson MP, told Parliament: 
 
[The Vegetation Management Act] put an end to the broadscale clearing of 
remnant vegetation in Queensland and has delivered the single largest 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions ever in Australia. It set the framework 
for the delivery to the then Howard government a 20- to 25-megaton 
reduction in carbon emissions and the ability to claim that Australia had met 
its international commitments outlined in the Kyoto Protocol (Robertson 2009, 
in Queensland Parliament 2009:64). 
 
The Australian government has thus  “booked up” the carbon asset on Aboriginal lands on 
Cape York, which has allowed it to set much lower targets for industry and the Australian 
public. 
Impacts on Indigenous Landholders 
As well as the additionality requirement, environmental legislation also imposes a 
disproportionate burden on indigenous landholders. The development aspirations of 
indigenous owners are subject to regulatory barriers that would have made the economic 
development of settler society impossible. These stringent restrictions on land clearing and 
development around waterways designed to “lock up the land” have been criticized as 
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“neocolonial” by indigenous groups in Cape York. Traditional owners express the view that 
non-indigenous “mismanagement in the past has apparently led to today’s feral species 
invasions” and dissatisfaction that their 40,000 year stewardship of the land has not been 
recognized (Sullivan 2008:12). Thus, indigenous peoples in Australia, similar to those in 
Canada, Ethiopia, New Zealand and Nigeria, who have not created the litany of environmental 
problems facing their countries and have not economically benefited from the industrialization 
causing the problems, bear a disproportionate portion of the burden in remedying them. This 
includes not only dealing with ongoing environmental degradation with limited resources but 
also reduced opportunities for economic development.  
 
The existing environmental regulation paradigm advantages those who have caused and 
benefitted from significant environmental damage, both by supporting their participation in the 
green economy (for example, through participation in the Carbon Farming Initiative/CFI, 
reforestation and improved land management practices) and by using command-and-control 
regulatory mechanisms that restrict development in so-called “wild” areas; that is, areas where 
settler development has not occurred. The intact landscapes of Northern Australia (containing 
the largest indigenous land holdings) have become the major focus of the expansion of the 
conservation estate in Australia. And when environmental laws, designed to protect relatively 
small areas of remnant landscape or environmental examples in the agricultural and population 
belts are applied to the northern Aboriginal estate, many of the laws are triggered across the 
majority of the landscape. Thus, the Aboriginal estate is proportionally affected to a much 
greater degree by conservation laws due to their intact nature.  
 
The disproportionate impact of environmental regulation on Cape York is compounded by the 
reality that the traditional owners of Cape York possess a limited capacity to navigate through 
layers of regulation. The costs of obtaining the requisite expertise, whether legal, scientific or 
financial, are far higher than for non-remote parts of Queensland. Given the relative economic 
disadvantage of Cape York traditional owners, these costs may be prohibitive (Bartlett 2010). 
This disproportionate bearing of the environmental burden serves to both diminish the 
opportunities for mainstream economic development, as well as exclude traditional owners 
from participation in green economy. 
Weak property rights 
A precondition for indigenous participation in PES markets is security and certainty of 
landholding. As Salzman notes: 
 
Since payment is generally premised on specific land use activities, the other 
basic obligation of the provider is to demonstrate sufficient ownership or 
control of the land to ensure service provision. The buyers need to know 
whom to pay and have some assurance that they can undertake the land 
management or service provision they have agreed to (Salzman 2009:7). 
 
There are a range of different rights and interests in land held by traditional owners on Cape 
York, including native title land, DOGIT land, Aboriginal freehold and leasehold (see figure 5). 
The difficulties posed by these different forms of tenure to the adoption of a PES approach are 
examined in the following section. 
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Figure 5: Cape York land tenure map  
 
Source: Earth Tech 2005:117. 
 
The Aboriginal Lands Act 1991 establishes a framework for the transfer of land to traditional 
owners. There are two distinct categories of land under the act: transferable land and claimable 
land. Land that is designated “transferable” can be transferred to traditional owners in the 
absence of a claim, whereas “claimable” land requires the traditional owners to apply to the 
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land tribunal. The overwhelming bulk of Aboriginal freehold on Cape York is transferable land 
rather than claimable land. A precondition for participation in PES markets is security of land 
tenure. Unfortunately, the protracted nature of the land transfer process under the Aboriginal 
Lands Act delays this certainty for traditional owners (Taft 2011). In addition, new 
environmental laws are being made over land and property rights that are yet to be transferred. 
 
A further issue arises in relation to leasehold land. A significant area of land on Cape York 
consists of pastoral leases held by traditional owners. These leases generally extend for long 
terms, typically between 30 and 70 years. The capacity of pastoral leaseholders to participate in 
PES schemes is likely to be limited for two reasons. First, their land use rights are restricted to 
certain categories of activities. Secondly, lessees must enter into a land management agreement 
with the government, which stipulates principles for the sustainable management of the land 
for the term of the lease. These land management agreements generally set out specific land 
management strategies for a host of outcomes. These obligations reduce the scope for additional 
environmental benefits to be achieved. 
 
The other key limitation of this form of land tenure is achieving permanence of environmental 
service benefits. PES schemes commonly involve long-term contracts for the provision of 
ecosystem services. Obviously, the limited duration of pastoral leases may impose constraints 
upon the ability of lessees to enter into such agreements. This problem is likely to be most 
pronounced in relation to carbon sequestration and storage PES schemes, where there will 
generally be a requirement of permanence; that is, that the carbon remains stored for a long 
period of time. These limitations mean that whilst there may be scope to engage in PES on 
pastoral leasehold land, these opportunities are likely to be relatively marginal. 
 
Another component of the land mix on Cape York is native title land, which can be both 
exclusive and non-exclusive. The native title regime under the Native Title Act (NTA) erects 
significant hurdles to indigenous participation in PES markets. In determining the content of 
native title rights, the approach taken by the High Court in Western Australia v Ward was to 
require particularization of each element of traditional law and custom (Bartlett 2003). The 
majority of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ held that determining the content of 
native title rights “requires not only the identification of the laws and customs said to be 
traditional laws and customs, but, no less importantly, the identification of the rights and 
interests in relation to land or waters which are possessed under those laws or customs” (High 
Court of Australia 2002:17–18). Bartlett accurately comments of this approach: 
 
The Court refuses to make any assumption that the society must necessarily 
have had a system of laws and customs that governed the society’s 
relationship to the land. It entails a very literal reading of the Native Title Act, 
severed from its origins, context and purpose which renders proof of native 
title inappropriately difficult (Bartlett 2003:8). 
 
The consequence of this excessively narrow approach to determining the content of native title 
is to undermine the likelihood of a declaration of native title rights able to support participation 
in the PES market. Rather than treating native title rights as holistic and comprehensive, akin to 
fee simple ownership, the approach taken has been to fragment the content of native title rights, 
erecting often-insurmountable evidentiary barriers to the finding of exclusive native title rights. 
Non-exclusive native title rights, which comprise a fragile foundation upon which to base 
ecosystem services, are likely to be the outcome of this judicial approach (Taft 2011). 
 
This narrow approach also treats native title rights as historical relics. The conception of native 
title as bundles of disconnected individual rights, and consequent fixation on the 
particularization of individual rights, restricts the capacity of native title rights to adapt to 
changing social and economic conditions. It means that the content of native rights is “frozen” 
as those precise rights enjoyed at the point of European colonization and sovereignty, rather 
than treating native title as a comprehensive system of relationships with the land capable of 
13 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF GREEN ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT   
OCCASIONAL PAPER SIX 
adaptation. Kirby J’s dissent in Western Australia v Ward rejected this freezing of native title 
rights: 
 
In relation to the capacity of the common law to recognize change and 
development in traditional laws and customs, I prefer North J’s approach. It 
supports the recognition of historical uses of resources, such as ochre. It also 
includes other minerals. It envisages the extension of such recognition to 
modern conditions, developed over time, so as to incorporate the use of other 
minerals and resources of modern relevance. Such an approach is generally 
consistent with the authority of this court and decisions in Canada. When 
evaluating native title rights and interests, a court should start by accepting 
the pressures that existed in relation to Aboriginal laws and customs to adjust 
and change after British sovereignty was asserted over Australia. In my 
opinion, it would be a mistake to ignore the possibility of new aspects of 
traditional rights and interests developing as part of Aboriginal customs not 
envisaged, or even imagined, in the times preceding settlement (High Court 
of Australia 2002:159, 574). 
 
Stoeckel correctly states that “this approach has frozen Aboriginal communities in the pre-
settlement era, denying them the ability to redefine their relationship with the land as 
challenges and changes arise” (Stoeckel 2003:272). Therefore, this approach poses almost 
insurmountable barriers to the declaration of the rights needed to underpin economic 
development, in either the mainstream economy or green economy. Weak Aboriginal property 
rights are allowing the government to continue to impose additional conservation laws and 
regimes over Aboriginal lands without meaningful negotiation or compensation. 
Commentators have noted that native title law should  
 
operate upon the well-established common law presumption of fee simple 
ownership based on demonstrated possession, rather than restricted rights to 
use the land in accordance with proven continuing traditional law and 
custom. Indigenous land law should be constructed to allow indigenous 
people full beneficial ownership of their returned land, so that land won can 
be a fungible asset for indigenous people (Morris, 2011a:40).  
 
While many countries have struggled with this issue, it must be noted that states such as Alaska 
may be getting it right by utilizing flexible land management approaches for native title land 
(Morris 2011b).  
 
The protracted nature of the NTA process is also likely to pose a barrier to the use of native title 
land for PES. The native title determination process is exceptionally arduous and lengthy. 
According to the 2009–2010 National Native Title Tribunal Annual Report, as at 30 June 2010, 36 
per cent of claims have been in the system for between 10 and 16.5 years (NNTT 2010:27). The 
length of this process led the National Native Title Council to state that “the current 
expenditure of time and resources in prosecuting a claim raises serious questions about the 
actual benefits of the system to indigenous people” (NNTC 2010:2). 
 
Regulatory challenges 
In addition to the various types of land tenure and rights noted above, some areas of the 
indigenous estate on Cape York are designated protected areas as either national parks or 
nature refuges under conservation agreements made between traditional owners and the 
Queensland government. This is occurring on Aboriginal-owned land, pastoral leases and 
through the current State Land Dealing process (where the government acquires pastoral leases 
and then negotiates with traditional owners about a 50-50 split between expanding the national 
park estate and the Aboriginal freehold estate). During this process of negotiation, large areas of 
the highest conservation value, such as wetlands, rainforest corridors and so on are allocated as 
national parks or nature refuges. The approach of embedding the “jewels of the crown” within 
larger blanket regulated estates has significantly reduced the private market value of potential 
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ecosystem services on the Aboriginal freehold and opportunities for sustainable economic 
activity more generally. 
 
Nature refuges are established under the Nature Conservation Act 1992. The management 
principles for nature refuges are established under section 22 and include the conservation of 
the area’s cultural and natural resources and provision for controlled use of those resources. 
Conservation agreements made between indigenous land trusts and the state government 
typically cover a range of areas, including permitted activities, management conditions for 
these permitted activities, prohibited activities and monitoring mechanisms. Although the 
different conservation agreements governing nature refuges on Cape York differ in some 
respects, they generally impose significant restrictions on indigenous land use. Typical 
restrictions include limitations on the use of timber resources for commercial purposes, 
agricultural and aquacultural activities, dams, mining activities and a range of other activities. 
The other key function of conservation agreements is the land management obligations they 
impose upon the land trust party. Common obligations are to develop and implement weed 
management strategies, reduce the environmental impact of feral animals such as pigs and 
brumbies, and develop and implement a fire management plan. The cumulative effect of these 
wide-ranging restrictions and obligations is to limit the scope of nature refuge areas to provide 
ecosystem services by reducing the scope to demonstrate additionality. 
There are a significant number of national parks on Cape York, some on the indigenous estate. 
These national parks include some Cape York Peninsula Aboriginal Land (CYPAL) national 
parks, owned by traditional owners as Aboriginal freehold. CYPAL national parks are jointly 
managed by traditional owners and the Department of Environment and Resource 
Management (DERM). An Indigenous Management Agreement provides the framework 
agreement for the relationship between the joint managers. Each national park is also managed 
in accordance with a park management plan. The management principles of national parks 
(including CYPAL national parks) are set out in section 17 of the Nature Conservation Act 1992. 
These principles provide for the permanent preservation of the area’s natural condition and the 
protection of the area’s cultural resources and values, and ensure that the only use of the area is 
nature-based and ecologically sustainable. These management principles mean that the scope 
for development activities is strictly limited and the capacity of such areas to form the basis for 
the provision of ecosystem services is negligible. This is likely to be the case even if land 
management outcomes within the national park area are poor due to inadequate funding levels 
or other reasons. 
Conclusion 
The current paradigm of environmental regulation is not benefiting traditional owners of Cape 
York because it reflects a system of environmental protection based on government 
dependency. The current system, characterized by restrictive environmental legislation with 
insufficient funding for adequate implementation on the ground, has resulted in suboptimal 
environmental outcomes, with short-term, overlapping projects, underfunded and understaffed 
projects and inadequate Aboriginal involvement. It has also resulted in suboptimal social 
outcomes, as it provides only short-term employment that fails to increase capacities and skills 
or provide long-term career paths for indigenous workers. The current government approach 
creates resentment among indigenous owners who not only feel that their land is being locked 
up, thereby denying them the opportunity for sustainable economic development, but also that 
they are not being permitted to take responsibility for either managing their land effectively or 
for the impacts of poor management.  
 
The current environmental protection regime fails to recognize the historical legacy of 
underdevelopment on Cape York, and responds to historical disadvantage by turning it into 
current and future disadvantage. Because of the limited extent of development on Cape York, 
traditional owners bear a disproportionate burden of command-and-control environmental 
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regulation that prohibits development in underdeveloped areas. The current regime embodies 
an approach to regulation that is suited to highly-populated “settled” areas where there has 
been economic development and consequent environmental degradation over an extended 
period. It is not an appropriate paradigm for Cape York, where the extent of environmental 
damage has been limited, at least in part because of the ethic of environmental stewardship 
practiced by traditional owners. This disproportionate impact of the environmental burden 
serves to both diminish the opportunities for mainstream economic development, as well as 
exclude traditional owners from participation in green economy. 
 
The regulatory burden imposed by both the Wild Rivers scheme and the Vegetation 
Management Act is severe. Half of the river systems declared to be wild rivers are located on 
the Cape York Peninsula and it is likely that current and potential future declarations will 
eventually mean that the majority of the indigenous estate on Cape York will fall within 
preservation areas. In addition, around 15 per cent of Cape York indigenous lands and almost 
all waterways will fall within high preservation areas. In addition, the introduction of 
legislation, such as land clearance laws, have resulted in the benefits accrued from Aboriginal 
lands being forcibly acquired by broader society without the legal process or recourse that 
would normally be available in a modern Western democracy. These dividends or benefits have 
benefited governments (through votes and expanded protected areas), green groups (through 
victories, memberships and donations), industry (through lower compliance targets) and the 
broader public (through lower personal targets, costs and obligations) while leaving the 
management liability with the traditional owners, the poorest and most marginalized people in 
Australian society.  
 
The cumulative effect of these laws, which are generally designed to protect remnant and 
highly threatened vegetation in regions where over 80 per cent of the landscape has been 
cleared or radically altered, has been to stifle not only mainstream economic opportunity but 
also emerging green industries in Cape York. For example, as the landscape of Cape York is 
largely intact, with little land clearing, the indigenous population has been unable to participate 
in projects selling carbon benefits from reforestation, as they are unable to meet additionality 
requirements. Further to this, the protected area estate is rapidly expanding through new 
national parks, nature conservation agreements and nature refuges across the Aboriginal estate. 
Alarmingly, some of these new and proposed conservation estates such as wild rivers and 
World Heritage are being imposed without Aboriginal consent and through third-rate 
“consultation” processes, breaching a range of national and international human rights 
agreements. These estates come with some government funding as well as management 
agreements that further remove ecosystem service market opportunities and property rights. 
 
A new approach to environmental regulation that genuinely recognizes the conditions and 
history of Cape York is needed. An approach such as PES would seek to reconcile the legitimate 
development aspirations of traditional owners with effective environmental protection 
mechanisms. The four key markets for ecosystem services, as identified by Wunder, are 
biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration and storage, watershed protection and landscape 
beauty (Wunder 2005:2). The potential for PES activities in Cape York should be significant and 
possible activities could include the following: (carbon) reforestation/afforestation; avoided 
deforestation; livestock management; savannah burning; reduced emissions or increased 
sequestration in agricultural soils; feral animal management; improved forest management; 
biochar; non-forest revegetation; land use conversions; wetland management and (biodiversity) 
turtle and dugong management; and cassowary conservation.  
 
However, what should have become one of the biggest economic values and opportunities for 
the Aboriginal people of the region—ecosystem services—is now increasingly becoming a 
liability. The simple ecosystem service marketplace fact is that the higher the potential or real 
threat is to the environment, the higher the ecosystem service value and the more trade and 
buyer options that are available. Most major perceived threats have now been legally removed 
from the region and are no longer tradable. Land clearance laws have halted land clearing so 
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one can no longer trade that right for carbon credits through avoided deforestation. There are 
still some significant PES opportunities such as fire management for carbon credits and some 
broader ecosystem services such as feral animal and weed control. Many major opportunities 
that are developing nationally are not relevant to an undamaged landscape such as tree 
planting and land use changes related to agriculture. The remaining PES opportunities come 
nowhere near compensating for the acquired carbon and environmental values.   
 
If Cape York is to realize the larger opportunities—the opportunities that could potentially fund 
the real costs and effective management of this vast and ecologically rich region—then 
significant policy changes will need to be made by governments at the state and federal level. 
As stated, this new approach should have at its core:  
 
• strengthening indigenous land tenure and property rights;  
• enacting long-term, integrated NRM goals and programmes with greater indigenous 
participation;  
• legally requiring ILUAs as part of any process of land use change on Aboriginal land such as 
new conservation regimes or industrial development; 
• the further exploration of PES approaches as complements to existing conservation tools; and 
• the establishment of a supportive legislative and policy environment to enable indigenous 
participation in PES markets. 
As stated earlier, more investigation is needed not only into the potential for PES markets and 
opportunity costs of conservation, but also into broader international opportunities around 
future international carbon agreements, future directions for biodiversity payments and “REDD  
plus” mechanisms to better understand the global implications raised in this paper. These larger 
opportunities have been acquired by the Australian government and accrued to society more 
generally at the expense of Aboriginal people. The challenge we need to put to society is to give 
equitable control of those assets so the landowners can manage their own country properly. 
Insufficiently funded, ad hoc government initiatives carried out by a small number of rangers 
will not protect Cape York’s valuable heritage. A diverse and large ecosystem service economy 
working alongside a broader mainstream economy will ensure protection of the region’s 
natural and cultural heritage as well as economic equity for its indigenous inhabitants.  
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